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Abstract:  An increasing number of authors describe the European Union as an advanced 
form of transgovernmentalism. Whether called Europeanization, supranational 
intergovernmentalism, multilevel governance, administrative fusion or Brusselisation, the 
transgovernmentalist thesis states that European politics is shaped by the growing interaction 
of national government officials at every level of the decision-making process. This paper 
tests the transgovernmentalist thesis by looking at patterns of formal and informal cooperation 
in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The data is based on 
a questionnaire circulated among 73 defence officials in France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Brussels-based institutions. The results are analyzed through social network 
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analysis. We find that the governance of ESDP is characterized by a weak form of 
transgovernmentalism, in which cross-border links do exist but formal state actors occupy 
strategic positions. In particular, two groups display transgovernmental features: a core policy 
group of crisis management and capability development officials in and around the Council, 
and a Franco-German group of capital-based defence actors. 
 
Keywords: Europeanization, governance, intergovernmentalism, networks, European 
Security and Defence Policy, political science 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the past 10 years, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has become one of 
the most dynamic sectors of administrative interaction in the European Union (EU).1 This has 
entailed the creation of several political-military bodies in Brussels as well as functional desks 
specifically devoted to European security cooperation in member state foreign and defence 
ministries (Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra and Maurer 2010). As a result, an expanding group of 
diplomats, policy advisers, military officers, civil servants, engineers and think tank personnel 
are now involved in the decision-making process and the implementation of ESDP in its 
various dimensions (military operations, civilian crisis management, capability development). 
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Pointing to various instances of Europeanisation, some analysts conclude that security and 
defence policy has moved beyond intergovernmental decision-making towards a 
transgovernmental form of governance. Whether called supranational intergovernmentalism, 
multilevel governance, administrative fusion or Brusselisation, the transgovernmentalist 
argument states that European politics is shaped by the growing interaction of national 
government officials at every level of the decision-making process (Wallace and Wallace 
2000; Webber et al. 2004; Regelsberger and Wessels 2005; Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006; 
Norheim-Martinsen 2010a).  
 
In this paper, we test the transgovernmental thesis through social network analysis, a 
methodology that detects patterns of formal and informal social relations across a policy field. 
The picture that emerges from our analysis confirms a weak form of transgovernmentalism in 
which cross-border ties between different policy actors have indeed developed along 
functional lines, but only among a handful of government actors who occupy strategic 
positions. Using original data gathered among 73 French, British, German, EU and NATO 
officials, we address two research questions. First, which actors occupy key strategic 
positions in the web of administrative cooperation? We find that specific government actors, 
namely security ambassadors, are located at the strategic core of the ESDP network. These 
actors, which we call “gatekeepers,” are Brussels-based, not capital-based, and we observe 
that there is a high density of social relations among domestic government actors in parallel to 
the formal meeting point of Council meetings. Second, is it possible to observe cohesive 
groups of actors who share particularly strong connections between themselves across 
borders? This is a key question if we want to weigh the possibility that transgovernmental 
coalitions will emerge over time along transnational or functional lines to push (or block) 
specific ESDP initiatives. In our analysis, two groups display transgovernmental features: a 
functional core policy group of crisis management and capability development officials in and 
around the Council, and a political Franco-German group of capital-based defence actors. 
This suggests that while there is room for cross-border collective action in ESDP, it will be 
limited to these narrow clusters of government officials for the foreseeable future. 
 
Within the context of this special issue, our article makes two contributions. First, it offers a 
systematic way of analyzing and conceptualizing administrative interaction in ESDP policy-
making. As Nuttall (2005) has argued, ESDP faces the twofold problem of coherence along 
the various dimensions of ESDP (capabilities, arms production, civil crisis management, 
military operations) and consistency between various institutions and actors. Consequently, a 
cross-sector analysis of the dynamics of ESDP has been lacking so far (Schroeder 2006). 
Most of the contributions in this issue address this gap with rich case studies of individual 
administrative bodies or specific crisis management operations. To supplement these case 
studies, social network analysis provides a methodology in which bureaucratic, political and 
non-governmental actors can be situated in a relational and comprehensive context of 
decision-making. In other words, by identifying patterns of cooperation within the ESDP 
domain, we can map out the social structure in which ESDP bodies and operations are 
embedded. Several findings in this special issue are confirmed by social network analysis; for 
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example, the relative weakness of the European Parliament (Stie 2010; Peter, Wagner and 
Deitelhoff 2010), the marginalization of civilian actors such as the Commission and NGOs 
(Norheim-Martinsen 2010b), and the “coordinator” role of the Council Secretariat (Juncos 
and Pomorska 2010).  
 
We also seek to contribute to the literature on the changing nature of governance in 
international security – whether between or within international security institutions. In this 
special issue, Petrov (2010) and Justaert and Keukeleire (2010) use the governance metaphor 
to describe the complex ESDP decision-making machinery, in which state and non-state, EU 
and national actors coexist alongside one another. A key challenge in this perspective is to 
identify potential policy entrepreneurs that fit the governance image of “beyond 
intergovernmentalism” (Norheim-Martinsen 2010a). In the literature on ESDP, authors have 
paid attention to the growing role of informal directorates such as the EU-3 (France, United 
Kingdom and Germany) or the “Quint” (Gegout 2002; Giegerich 2006). By revealing the 
existence of a core policy cluster and a Franco-German cluster, social network analysis 
identifies two other likely policy entrepreneurs in ESDP governance.  
 
It is worth emphasizing that our approach is a structural one. We are interested in the ESDP 
network as a social structure and not as a collective actor or as a mode of policy-making. The 
contribution of a structural approach is that it allows us to detect informal social relations in 
addition to formal ones in the ESDP field. It is thus well suited to verify the growth of a social 
layer beneath formal state interactions, which is the key claim made by transgovernmentalists. 
In EU studies, structural social network perspectives have been applied to analyze influence 
in the common agricultural policy (Ray and Henning 1999) and the transfer of social policy to 
Eastern Europe (Sissenich 2008). In security policy, by contrast, the use of networks has been 
more metaphorical. Krahmann (2005) and Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2009), for example, use 
qualitative methods to describe and compare emerging forms of security cooperation as well 
as their effects on global governance.  
 
2. What is a transgovernmental network? 
Jolyon Howorth (2000) coined the term “supranational intergovernmentalism” to capture the 
phenomenon whereby several institutions and groups take root in Brussels and tend to 
formulate and even drive ESDP policies. This is close to the idea of Brusselisation used by 
David Allen (1998) and Simon Nuttall (2000) to describe the institutionalization of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 1990s. European security observers indeed 
generally agree with Kirchner and Sperling (2007: 9) that: 
 
“National authorities in the EU can no longer unilaterally fulfil their primary responsibilities of maintaining 
territorial integrity and ensuring economic growth. Not only do security threats now trespass into areas once 
considered to be strictly domestic, but the transformation of the European state has made it increasingly 
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difficult to achieve its security goals owing to the vulnerabilities of the post-Westphalian state to external 
shocks. The mitigation of those vulnerabilities evades a national solution …”  
 
These various concepts speak to a form of international cooperation defined by Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye (1974) as transgovernmentalism. According to Keohane and Nye 
(1974: 43), transgovernmental cooperation implies “direct interactions among sub-units of 
different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of cabinets or 
chief executives of those governments.” These networks of government officials interact 
beneath formal state hierarchies along functional lines (through transversal bureaucratic 
cooperation) to produce policy outcomes (Slaughter 2004). By contrast, intergovernmentalism 
describes traditional inter-state relations that take place exclusively via chiefs of government 
and the formal diplomatic machinery, while transnationalism refers to dense interaction across 
different levels of society – thus including non-state actors and supranational organizations 
such as the EU in a more complex form of governance.  
 
Each form of international cooperation defined by Keohane and Nye corresponds to a 
different network structure. These network structures differ along two dimensions: the locus 
of gatekeeping and the strength of national borders (Sissenich 2008). Gatekeeping refers to 
who controls access to important sections of the network. Border effects refer to the 
boundaries that delineate cohesive groups within the network. As depicted in Graph 1, a 
stylized intergovernmental network structure is one in which chief executives (or their 
representatives) constitute the sole gatekeepers. Supranational institutions are marginal and 
there are no meaningful cross-border connections beneath the level of formal state 
representatives. Thus, there are strong gatekeeping and strong border effects. Graph 2, by 
contrast, depicts a hypothetical transnational network, in which state and non-state actors, as 
well as EU institutions, are related in numerous ways above and beneath formal diplomatic 
links. Gatekeeping and border effects are, therefore, non-existent. In between these two 
extremes, Graph 3 describes a transgovernmental network, in which a dense web of relations 
above and beneath formal hierarchies coalesce around the EU level, but national state actors 
remain at the core of the network. Here, border effects are weak but gatekeeping by 
government actors remains strong. In this paper, we operationalize transgovernmentalism as a 
strong fit between the empirical ESDP network and this stylized transgovernmental network 
structure. 
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Graph 1. Intergovernmentalism 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2. Transnationalism 
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Graph 3. Transgovernmentalism 
 
 
3.  Method and data 
Our research strategy is to measure gatekeeping and border effects in the empirical ESDP 
network. Strong gatekeeping by government actors associated with weak border effects would 
be evidence of a transgovernmental structure in the ESDP network. Conversely, strong border 
and gatekeeping effects would be evidence of an intergovernmental structure while weak 
border and gatekeeping effects would substantiate transnationalist arguments. To graph the 
ESDP network, we use the Pajek software package for social network analysis. The data used 
to graph this network was collected through a standardized questionnaire circulated to “key” 
ESDP actors in France, Germany, the UK, and in Brussels. We conceive of an actor not as a 
person but as an organizational unit with unity of function. This includes the many divisions 
in a government department that deal with European security (for example the EU, CFSP and 
NATO desks as well as the political directorate and political staff in a foreign ministry) but 
also interest groups, political actors and think tanks that focus on ESDP. There are sound 
reasons to begin with these three countries (in addition to the two European security 
organizations). First, these countries provide a good starting point for analysis because they 
are the most consequential military powers in the system of European security governance 
(Webber et al. 2004). Second, each has a distinct strategic outlook with which other EU 
member states tend to align (Mérand 2008; Jones 2007; Howorth 2007).  
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Delineating the scale of a network is a challenge because it depends on analytical criteria and 
not on random sampling. Three standard criteria were used to identify the population of key 
ESDP actors (cf. Kriesi and Jegen 2001): (1) we scanned the organizational chart of every 
government department, political party or interest group interested in security policy with a 
view to identifying decision-making units and observers in France, Germany, the UK, and in 
EU institutions (positional criterion); (2) we did an in-depth study of ESDP-related 
conferences, seminars, summits, etc. in order to extract actors who took a stand on ESDP 
issues on behalf of their organization (participative criterion); (3) we submitted the resulting 
list containing several hundred units to a small group of ESDP experts, who added key units 
they thought were missing, but also subtracted those they thought were too marginal to ESDP 
debates (reputational criterion). A sample of 100 ESDP actors was created on the basis of 
that last iteration. 
 
The questionnaire was circulated between October 2007 and May 2009. To graph the 
network, respondents were asked whom they had cooperated with in the past two years on 
ESDP files. We define cooperation as the intensive exchange of important information and 
joint work towards the development of common positions. Consequently, the network is 
based on social relations of cooperation. Most questionnaires were administered in face-to-
face interviews but, in a limited number of cases, they were left for the interviewee to fill out. 
The latter option was only used to minimize missing data, as we preferred to err in the 
direction of increasing the response rate, which is 73% (73 actors). Only 43 of the 
questionnaires could be used to perform network analysis, but symmetrization produced a 
network of 117 actors.2 Taken together, French, British and German actors represent 89% of 
our population. Thirty percent are career diplomats, 24% military officers, 16% EU or 
national members of parliament, 18% academics, interest group or NGO people, and 12% 
civilian officials (e.g. civilian official working in a defence ministry or EU fonctionnaire). 
Some diplomats and military officers are seconded to EU institutions, usually the Council 
Secretariat, or to the executive branch. Thirty-one percent of our sample work in Brussels and 
the remainder in national capitals. All the interviewees held positions of responsibility in 
organizational units. While names cannot be divulged for reasons of confidentiality, we are 
confident that this sample provides an accurate picture of the ESDP domain so far as France, 
Germany, and the UK are concerned. 
 
Two methodological limitations should be stressed. First, because data collection was limited 
to three EU member states (in addition to Brussels-based institutions), it is likely that we were 
not able to capture patterns that are more prevalent in countries with different security 
traditions, notably non-aligned countries. The weakness of civilian and non-state actors in our 
analysis may be a result of the fact that we selected the EU’s three military powers, while 
countries like Sweden and Finland have been more involved in civilian files. Another 
potential bias is related to the timeframe of the study. Fieldwork was conducted during four 
successive EU presidencies: Portugal, Slovenia, France, and the Czech Republic. Also, the 
main activity during this period was EUFOR Chad, an operation with a strong military 
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component led by the French. As a result, the role of French and military actors in our 
analysis may have been altered somewhat since they may have been more solicited than is 
usually the case. Note, however, that we did not conduct a disproportionate number of 
interviews under any of these four presidencies. 
 
4.  The Main ESDP Brokers: Beyond National Gatekeeping? 
In this section, we identify the main brokers in the ESDP field. Based on network theory, we 
assume that certain actors occupy strategic positions in the network that depend on their 
ability to control the flow of cooperation (Scott 2000). Brokerage is a measure of the 
importance of one’s ties in bridging different components of the network, that is, in keeping 
the social structure together. Brokerage suggests that some actors become key points of 
contact because they control access to specific subgroups. The disappearance of these brokers 
would break the network into its constituent parts.3 Pajek produces a structural index of 
brokerage, called gatekeeping, which captures the ability to control the flow of cooperation 
towards one’s subgroup (de Nooy et al. 2005: 151).4  
 
Measuring gatekeeping requires that we assign each organizational unit to a predetermined 
partition. We defined six groups in the network: France, UK, Germany, EU, NATO, and 
interest groups/think tanks. In our view, these three governmental, two intergovernmental and 
one non-state group correspond to the main formal categories of actors in CSDP. Whereas an 
intergovernmental network structure should be composed of only one gatekeeper per group 
(with a high gatekeeping score) – for example the executive branch of a country – a 
transgovernmental or a transnational structure should be composed of several gatekeepers, 
reflecting the relative fluidity of cooperation patterns. For the transgovernmentalist thesis to 
hold, it is particularly important that government actors should be gatekeepers to their country 
but that no single government actor controls all access; there must be several governmental 
gates to the domestic level, so to speak.  
 
Table 1 displays a list of the top 16 gatekeepers in the ESDP network based on two different 
matrices. For each actor, we give two scores: Column A is the score based on the original 
matrix in which collaborative ties are directed (e.g. y reported collaboration with z but z did 
not). Column B is the score based on the “symmetrized” matrix. To symmetrize, we produce 
an undirected network in which any identified cooperation, regardless of whether it was 
reported by only one or the two actors involved, is considered to be a tie. In other words, in 
the symmetrized matrix we assume that self-reported cooperative ties are necessarily 
reciprocal, while in the original matrix, we did not. Accepting potentially unilateral ties 
explains why gatekeeping scores are higher in a symmetrized network.5 The substantial 
overlap of Column A and Column B (for the top 16 positions), however, is evidence of the 
reliability of the symmetrical matrix vis-à-vis the non-symmetrical matrix.6  
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Taken as a whole, the results presented in Table 1 are instructive. The number of gatekeepers 
in the ESDP network is small and, regardless of which matrix we use, the three PSC 
ambassadors come up in the six top gatekeeping positions. This means that: (1) formal 
diplomatic representatives are the main point of contact between their domestic colleagues 
and other ESDP actors; (2) they generally occupy key strategic positions in the ESDP 
network. But, in contrast to the pre-ESDP era when capital-based political directors controlled 
the agenda (Smith 2004), these actors are permanently based in Brussels where they interact 
on a weekly basis. They also have to share their gatekeeping role with a limited number of 
government actors who also act as brokers. Other national gatekeepers include: in Germany, 
the capital-based political directorate, the foreign ministry’s policy staff and the defence 
staff’s EU division; in France, the defence ministry’s strategic affairs delegation, the defence 
staff’s EU affairs division and the foreign minister’s political director; and, in the UK (but to 
a much lesser extent), the defence staff. Seasoned observers of the ESDP scene will have 
instinctively recognized these actors as very plausible brokers in the ESDP domain, but social 
network analysis produces results that are grounded in systematic patterns of cooperation. 
 
Overall, this suggests that gatekeeping by Brussels-based state actors is strong across the 
ESDP domain. Gatekeeping among EU institutions is more diffuse. Indeed, several political-
military bodies seem to play a minor brokering role: the EU Military Committee, the EU 
Military Staff, the European Defence Agency, and the Council Secretariat’s DG for political-
military affairs, to which one should add the European Parliament’s security and defence 
subcommittee. This can be attributed to the fact that, by virtue of their coordination mandate, 
each of these organizational units has to cultivate relations with a fairly wide range of actors 
from different EU member states. Among interest groups, the Aerospace and Defence 
Industry Association of Europe (ASD) stands out: this is not surprising given that it represents 
30 industry associations in Brussels. More interesting is the gatekeeping role played by the 
Centre for European Reform, which despite the fact that it is based in London, has been 
arguably the most active think tank with regards to ESDP since 2000, with several remarked 
publications and events.  
 
The analysis of gatekeeping yields a picture that is both nuanced and faithful to ESDP’s terms 
of reference, one in which formal state representatives occupy strategic positions. Despite this 
privileged status, however, PSC ambassadors do not fully control the dense flow of 
cooperation that criss-crosses the network and easily transcends borders. Other government 
actors, especially officials in defence and foreign ministries, also control access to domestic 
subnetworks. Interestingly, political leaders, such as 10 Downing Street, the foreign 
minister’s cabinet or the High Representative’s staff, are more remote from the main channels 
of cooperation. As Duke and Vanhoonacker (2006) argue, administrative actors are more 
heavily involved in everyday policy-making than political actors.  
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Table 1. Gatekeeping Scores in the ESDP Network 
(partitions: Germany, France, UK, EU, NATO, interest groups/think tanks) 
 Non-symmetrical collaboration 
network 
Symmetrical collaboration 
network 
UKPR (PSC ambassador) 36 184 
German PR (PSC ambassador) 35 117 
European Parliament SEDE 30 86 
German defence staff EU affairs 28 134 
French PR (PSC ambassador) 24 334 
ASD 21 41 
EU Military Committee 20 38 
German Foreign Ministry’s policy 
staff 
19 47 
French Defence Ministry’s 
Delegation for Strategic Affairs 
19 127 
EU Military Staff 19 36 
Centre for European Reform 16 85 
European Defence Agency 15 70 
German Foreign Ministry’s 
Political Directorate 
12 767 
French Foreign Ministry’s Political 
Directorate 
3 96 
UK Defence Staff 1  59 
Council DG-E 0 65 
French Defence Staff’s EU Affairs 0 72 
 
 
 
We also find that different administrations are structured differently, gatekeeping being more 
diffuse among EU bodies than in the capitals. Gatekeeping is in fact strongest among interest 
groups and think tanks, which suggests that very few interest groups and think tanks have 
privileged access to the rest of the ESDP network. In general, PSC ambassadors and the ASD 
derive a prominent gatekeeping role from their mandate as government or industry 
representatives while EU institutions, which are supposed to act as coordinators, exhibit 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-005a.htm   11 
 
EIoP                        © 2010 by Frédéric Mérand, Stephanie C. Hofmann and Bastien Irondelle 
 
weaker gatekeeping strength. As Juncos and Pomorska (2010) show in their article, the latter 
role is well understood by Council officials, who use words like “secretariat” or “facilitator” 
to describe their tasks. 
 
5.  Crossing Borders: A Basis for Transgovernmental Coalitions? 
After gatekeeping, we now turn to a closer analysis of border effects, which is the second 
dimension of an international cooperation structure. One way of measuring border effects is to 
map out the constellation of actors. We want to see which actors have similar patterns of 
collaborative ties. This is called “structural equivalence” in social network analysis. Actors 
who belong to structurally equivalent positions and, in addition, who are related to each other, 
can be assumed to form cohesive subgroups. These actors are more likely to form coalitions 
that will push for specific policy initiatives. At the political level, an example would be the 
2003 proposal to set up a European Headquarters made by France, Germany, Belgium and 
Luxembourg (dubbed the “Chocolates”). At the bureaucratic level, it could include attempts 
on the part of defence procurement officials to push for new armaments programs in the 
context of the European Defence Agency. While intergovernmentalism assumes that such 
clusters will be structured along national lines, transgovernmentalism predicts that they will 
be structured along functional lines and thus across borders. Transnationalism would add that 
a significant number of non-state actors should be involved in these clusters. 
 
Thus, we define a potential coalition as a cohesive subgroup in which all actors meet two 
conditions: (1) they have identical ties to other actors (structural equivalence), and (2) they are 
related to each other (relation). In network theory, structural equivalence can be analyzed 
through a procedure called blockmodeling. Like the analysis of gatekeeping, blockmodeling 
requires that we impose a number of clusters on the network. We tested several options and, 
at the end, assigned seven clusters to the blockmodel.7 This corresponds to our theoretical 
expectation that the ESDP field is structured around seven formal groups: France, the UK, 
Germany, EU, NATO, interest groups, and think tanks (here we distinguish the two kinds of 
non-state actors).  
 
To detect structural equivalence, blockmodeling produces an image matrix, which 
distinguishes blocks in which actors have identical ties (called complete blocks [com]) from 
blocks in which there are no such patterns (- or null). In a large network such as ours, it is 
very rare that perfect blocks of structural equivalence can be formed (that is, clusters in which 
groups of actors have perfectly identical social relations). That is why blockmodeling 
rearranges the matrix of collaborative ties until blocks of structural equivalence are found 
wherein error is minimized. The final error matrix shows the error score for each block, that 
is, the number of ties that do not fit a perfect structural equivalence pattern at the end of the 
iterative blockmodeling procedure. 
 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-005a.htm   12 
 
EIoP                        © 2010 by Frédéric Mérand, Stephanie C. Hofmann and Bastien Irondelle 
 
Table 2 shows the ESDP network’s image and final error matrices. Since we add the 
condition that actors need to be related to each other, only the complete groups that show up 
along the main diagonal of the image matrix will be retained (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 
419). The image matrix then shows three cohesive subgroups, illustrated by the presence of a 
complete [com] block on the diagonal. These cohesive sub-groups are central in the ESDP 
network: 14 of their members are also among the top 16 gatekeepers. The members of these 
groups are listed on Table 3. Block A (cross section of 3-3 on the image matrix) includes 
French defence officials and EU Council Secretariat staff. Block B (cross section of 4-4 on 
the image matrix) includes EU political-military bodies, also located in the Council 
Secretariat, the French foreign ministry’s political director, and the British defence staff and 
Permanent Representation. These two blocks, we would argue, form the core group of the 
ESDP bureaucratic machinery, both in Brussels and in the capitals. Block C (cross section of 
6-6 on the image matrix) depicts a group of capital-based, mostly defence ministry-related 
Franco-German actors. The other complete blocks (for example 3-2 or 5-2) contain actors 
who are structurally equivalent but not necessarily related to each other and so are not 
considered to be cohesive.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Image and Error Matrix - 7 assigned clusters 
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Table 3. Cohesive Sub-Groups 
           CORE ESDP ACTORS                        FRANCO-GERMAN GROUP 
Block A (3-3) Block B (4-4) Block C (6-6) 
French Defence Ministry EU 
Affairs 
French Defence Ministry’s 
Delegation for Strategic 
Affairs 
FPR PSC Ambassador 
DGE Council Secretariat 
EUMS 
French Foreign Ministry 
Political Director 
French Defence Staff 
UKPR PSC Ambassador 
UKPR Military Representative 
PSC 
EU High Representative 
European Defence Agency 
EUMC 
French Defence Staff EU Affairs
French defence minister’s cabinet 
German Defence Ministry Policy 
Staff 
German Defence Staff EU Affairs 
German Defence Ministry Policy 
Staff 
German Chancellery 
 
 
Our results are quite robust. Roughly the same constellation of actors is found when running a 
blockmodeling procedure with four, five, six or eight assigned clusters. Although the 
structural equivalence position of some actors changes, we find each time one or two 
transgovernmental groups of core ESDP actors that include Council Secretariat bodies, the 
Brussels-based permanent representations, and sometimes key ESDP decision-makers from 
the capitals, along with a small Franco-German group centred around the German 
Chancellery, the German defence ministry and the French defence ministry. Four procedures 
out of five also generated a small group of German-only decision-makers. None of the 
parliamentary, interest group, think tank or functional (non-ESDP) government divisions 
belong to a cohesive subgroup in any of the blockmodels (that is, they may be in a structurally 
equivalent position but not related to each other).  
 
This suggests that there exist two potential transgovernmental coalitions in the ESDP domain. 
First, the core policy group of crisis management and capability development officials, which 
brings together the Council Secretariat, the permanent representations, and a number of 
capital-based security officials. Second, we consistently find a smaller but very robust Franco-
German group of (mostly) defence officials who are based in their capitals. This is evidence 
of an intensive border crossing that is, however, limited to a very small number of 
government officials. Although other ESDP actors are not completely trapped by their 
national borders, there are few structurally equivalent positions across borders that would 
suggest any basis for cohesion and collective action. While a modicum of 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-005a.htm   14 
 
EIoP                        © 2010 by Frédéric Mérand, Stephanie C. Hofmann and Bastien Irondelle 
 
transgovernmentalism is definitely taking place, we find little trace of transnationalism or 
security governance beyond government actors.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
This article is part of a larger research project on the ESDP domain.8 To date, scholars have 
no reliable and systematic information on ESDP decision-making processes. Ultimately, the 
objective of our project is to map out the policy domain by identifying the position of actors, 
their social relations, trajectory, social representations, and role in the decision-making 
process. The social network analysis of the ESDP domain presented here provides tentative 
answers to two research questions. Using cooperation as an indicator, we observe that the 
actors who are formally responsible for speaking on behalf of their state, namely the PSC 
ambassadors, occupy a strategic position in the web of cooperation. These actors act as the 
main gatekeepers for their respective domestic government arena. Several EU political-
military bodies also play an important role, but as coordinators. Especially around EU 
institutions, the network is quite dense and contains a number of transversal links between 
bureaucratic actors from different countries, some of whom also provide access to important 
sections of the network – but they do not go beyond what is expected of formal bureaucratic 
interaction. By and large, political leaders, interest groups and think tanks are marginal in 
daily cooperation practices. 
 
The transgovernmentalist thesis finds greater support when looking at the constellation of 
actors in structurally equivalent positions. In line with the transgovernmentalist thesis, our 
findings thus suggest a fairly high degree of interaction among actors from different countries, 
which may sometimes lead to genuine cooperation across borders, but predominantly along 
narrow bureaucratic lines. We discern two potential coalitions that cross national boundaries: 
a core policy group of crisis management and capability development officials in and around 
the Council, and a Franco-German group of capital-based defence actors. While the former is 
mainly functional in character, the latter looks more political and could be related to 50 years 
of close Franco-German cooperation. Thus, there are clear elements of transgovernmentalism 
in the ESDP domain, but the phenomenon seems limited to a narrow group of officials. The 
next step will be to analyze whether these two cohesive subgroups have played a key role in 
specific cases of decision-making, such as the decision to launch a crisis management 
operation or to develop a procurement program. 
 
Has ESDP moved beyond formal inter-state relations? A close look at the ESDP network 
provides some nuances in the theoretical debate between, on the one hand, realists and 
intergovernmentalists who believe that ESDP is an instrument in the hands of big states that 
pursue their national interest and, on the other hand, constructivists and institutionalists who 
argue that the EU is playing a key role in forging compromises in the ever more complex 
governance of European security (Irondelle 2003). This article suggests that it may be 
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impossible to draw a clear line or adjudicate between these two well-entrenched positions. 
Indeed, what emerges from our structural approach to ESDP is a policy domain in which 
intergovernmentalism and transgovernmentalism coexist as forms of security governance.  
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Endnotes 
1 A first version of this paper was presented at the Maastricht University Workshop, “Bureaucracy at 
Work: The Role of the Administrative Level in ESDP.” We wish to thank the organizers, Sophie 
Vanhoonacker, Hylke Dijkstra, Heidi Maurer, Petar Petrov and Karolina Pomorska; our discussant, 
Simon Duke; as well as two anonymous reviewers from the European Integration online Papers. 
2 Some respondents did not fill out the network matrix, or did not fill it out properly, which generates 
missing data. On symmetrization, see following section. 
3 Technically, a broker is a vertex (here an actor) whose removal creates a structural hole and thus 
increases the number of separate components in the network. 
4 A gatekeeper is situated on a path from an actor from another group towards an actor from his or her 
own group, provided that these actors are not themselves directly connected. Gatekeepers can be 
ranked according to the number of incomplete triads (that is, subnetworks containing three actors) in 
which the actor is a broker. 
5 Symmetrization is a common procedure in social network analysis to address the problem of missing 
data but it has the potential effect of skewing the data. For example, an actor who identified a large 
number of collaborative ties could end up being a broker even though others did not necessarily 
identify this actor as a collaborator. To correct this potential bias, we eliminated from the network 
actors who reported an unreasonably high number of cooperative ties relative to the number of times 
they were themselves identified as collaborators. But the best remedy is to cross check the original and 
symmetrized results. 
6 Note, however, that the ranking of gatekeepers is altered. Cross-checking the two columns suggests 
that the gatekeeping score of four actors (the German foreign ministry’s political directorate, the 
strategic policy division of the French foreign ministry, the French defence staff, the UK defence staff, 
and the EU Council Secretariat’s political-military DG) is probably underestimated in the original 
matrix, while that of four other actors (Aerospace and Defence Industry Association of Europe, EU 
Military Committee, EU Military Staff, and Auswärtiges Amt’s policy planning staff) is probably 
overestimated. This is due to the fact that gatekeeping considers the flow of cooperation to one’s 
group and not from one’s group in the original matrix, while both flows are considered in the 
symmetrized matrix. To our knowledge, there are no methodological grounds to choose one ranking 
over the other. 
7 Here, we use the symmetrized network. 
8 The three-year (2006-2009) research project, funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research 
Council, was led by Frédéric Mérand (Université de Montréal). The research team included Stephanie 
C. Hofmann (Graduate Institute, Geneva), Bastien Irondelle (Sciences Po Paris), Niagalé Bagayoko 
(IDS, Brighton), Philippe Manigart, André Dumoulin, Mathias Bonneu and Delphine Resteigne 
(Royal Military Academy, Brussels). 
